24 January 2009

Baluchistan And Islamic Republic Of Iran’s Brotherly Love

Baluchi journalist and civil society activist Yaqoub Mehrnahad, 22, was executed on 4 August 2008. He was the head and co-founder of Voice of Justice Young People’s Society (VJYP), Executive Summary
Despite propaganda, the Islamic Republic of Iran has not been the promised utopia of religious and social harmony. Instead, religious buildings are routinely demolished and dissidents executed.
Iran is remarkably diverse. 10-15m people are Sunni muslims; there are also Arabs, Kurds, Turkmen, and Baluchis as well in the country. This means Iran is a real patchwork society.
Attempts at moderation have largely been a failure and in Baluchistan, there is much unrest. Violence is common.
Indeed, the Islamic Republic of Iran is a religiously repressive regime and Muhammad Khatami's statements about peaceful coexistence cannot be believed. For the past three decades, Islamic Republic of Iran’s officials have been trying to convince the world that they are trying to create a utopian society in which religion, politics and faith can live in harmony. Unfortunately some officials have bought in to this idea. Following that policy the Iranian government recently called for a conference on "Religion in the Modern World." With former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, former high commissioner on human rights Mary Robinson, past prime ministers of Italy and Norway, and former president of Portugal in attendance, Muhammad Khatami, the former Iranian president and a likely candidate in the next presidential election, called upon the "religious leaders of the world to try new ways to create a peaceful co-existence and invite the world to establish peace and security."
This is a commendable and noble appeal, but one that is overshadowed by the brutal history of religious intolerance in Iran under the Islamic republic which Khatami represents. Consider some events.
Last year, security forces entered the Imam Abu Hanifa Mosque (A Sunni mosque) in the Azimabad suburb of the city of Zabol. The mosque also served as a religious school and dormitory. They arrested and evacuated the sleeping students and staff and then brought in bulldozers and destroyed the building.
Several other mosques have been destroyed in a similar fashion recently. In fact since the establishment of the Islamic Republic in Iran in 1979, many Sunni mosques in predominately Shi'ite cities have been destroyed, closed, or converted to Shi'ite mosques. In cities such as Mashhad, Ahwaz, Turbat-e-Jaam, Shiraz and Teheran, many Sunni mosques have been closed or destroyed by the regime. Getting a license to build a new one in most cities is impossible. Such a systematic assault on mosques by a regime that professes Islamic faith is quite astounding. Why does the Islamic republic destroy mosques?
The answer may lie in Iran’s religious diversity. Although the Majority of Iranians are Shiites, Iran, religiously is not a uniform society by any definition. Iran has a significant Sunni population. Nearly 10 to 15 million people in Iran are Sunnis. These include most of the Baluchis, the majority of Kurds, almost all Turkmen and a minority of Arabs.
Followers of other religions such as Baha’i’s, Zoroastrians, Jews, Christians and many branches of Sufis are also numerous. If one adds the secular Shiites and the traditionalist followers of Shiite Islam who oppose the official interpretation of Shiite Islam by the Islamic regime, the number of Shiites who follow the regime’s interpretation of Shiite Islam may not be as numerous as the regime would want us to believe.
Religious intolerance is not new to the Islamic republic. Since the establishment of the republic in 1979, all of Iran's religious minorities have suffered varying degrees of pressure and persecution. Even Shi'ite groups are not immune from persecution if they do not adhere to the Khomeini's radical interpretations.
One case in point is Ayatollah Kazemaini Borujerdiand. He was imprisoned and tortured with many of his followers. His crime was to call for a non-political interpretation of Shiite Islam and for the separation of religion and state.
Last year, two Sunni clerics Moulavi Muhammad Yousof Sohrabi and Moulavi Abdoulghodus Mollazahi were executed after being forced to confess on television that they were actively creating divisions between Shi'ites and Sunnis.
Last June, five young Baluchi men, Abdi Gowharmzhai, Hafiz Salahoudin Gowharamzahi, Moulavi Khalil Zarai, Moulavi Abdel Majid Salahzahi and Oubid Zardkohit were arrested during a raid by the Mersad forces of the revolutionary Guards during an attack to the village of Nasirabad located in Baluchistan province. The attack’s aim was to arrest the local Sunni religious cleric Moulavi Abed Bahramzahi. The five young men were arrested when they tried to prevent the Mersad forces from arresting the cleric, the Baluchistan Human Rights Watch reported. According to the organization, dedicated to reporting the human rights conditions in Baluchistan, there is a real possibility that the five young men could be executed.
Baluchi journalist and civil society activist Yaqoub Mehrnahad, 22, was executed on 4 August 2008. He was the head and co-founder of Voice of Justice Young People’s Society (VJYP), which organized events such as concerts, educational courses for young Baluchies and raised funds to help the poor. His sixteen year old brother Ebrahim Mehrnahad was also arrested last March following his public condemnation of the death sentence imposed up on his brother. He was sentenced to five years in prison last September.
Another Baluchi, Mr. Djalal Shirani, who lived in UAE for many years was arrested and executed recently when he came back to Iran after many years of living abroad to visit his ailing mother. It is not clear what was he exactly charged with.
Many observers of Baluchistan believe that poverty, discrimination and brutal oppression of the local population in the hands of the Shiite forces of the Islamic republic have contributed to the rise in radicalism of the local young Baluchi’s and to the rise in violence in many provinces with predominately Sunni population.
Yet even moderate Sunni clerics are not immune as is evident in the case of Maulavi (a religious title used by Iranian Sunnis) Ahmad Narouee, who is the deputy director of the main theological school in Zahedan. Narouee is one of the most moderate Baluchi Sunni clerics in Sistan-Baluchistan province. He comes from one of the oldest and most influential Baluchi clans, and he is widely respected. Although many members of the Narouee clan have been killed since 1979, Mawlavi Narouee remains tolerant in his views. His moderate views are often criticized by radical elements in the province. But many credit him and his moderate colleagues with preventing increased bloodshed and violence in the province. Yet none of that seem to matters to the radical Islamic regime in Teheran. Narouee was arrested last year and was being kept incommunicado in an undisclosed location for five month before being released last Saturday on Jan 17. It is not clear why he was arrested in the first place or why he was released.
Despite what Khatami, a likely presidential candidate would like others to believe, religious intolerance in Baluchistan and other Sunni areas seems to be the norm rather than exception under the Islamic Republic of Iran. It evokes Edmund Burke’s quote: "hypocrisy can afford to be magnificent in its promises, for never intending to go beyond promises, it costs nothing." Khatami and the regime he represent should be forced to respond to serious questioning about the recent events in Iran. His easy statements about "peaceful coexistence" must not be accepted so easily by the world. It is certainly not accepted by many Iranians.
Nir Boms is vice president of the Center for Freedom in the Middle East. Shayan Arya is an Iranian activist, member of Constitutionalist Party of Iran and associate researcher at the Institute for Monitoring Peace and Cultural Tolerance in School Education.

23 January 2009

CJP summons head of Balochistan police


Chief Justice of Pakistan Abdul Hameed Dogar here Thursday directed Provincial Police Officer Balochistan to probe into a reported abduction matter and submit report on January 28, besides giving protection to family of the complainant. He issued the direction after taking a suo motu notice on an appeal of Haji Mian Khan Kundhrani r/o Barkhan. In his plea,
he stated that his son Guljan was abducted on May 13 last year by Sardar Abdul Rehman, an influential political figure of Balochistan whose wife Mrs. Nasreen Rehman is also a provincial minister. The accused had issued verdict for marriage of two girls of his tribe, namely Izroo and Lal Khatoon with his gunmen but upon refusal he got an FIR registered against them

Residents of Lyari stage demo for Arshad Pappu

KARACHI: A number of people including women from the Lyari area staged a demonstration against the continued detention of Lyari gangster Arshad Pappu and strongly demanded his immediate release. Pappu has been in the Central Prison, Karachi since 2005 under criminal charges. The protesters carrying banners and flags of the ruling PPP chanted slogans in favor of Pappu and against the jail authorities. The slogans inscribed on banners include, “Lyari mein Baloch qoum ki nasakashi band karo” (Stop genocide of the Balochis) and “Jail mein Sardar Arshad Pappu ke sath zulm band karo” (Stop being barbaric to Sardar Arshad Pappu).According to a banner, the protestors had come from different areas of the Lyari, including Bhand Muhalla, Eidoo Lane and Ali Muhmmad Muhalla. They demanded that Karachi Prison Jailors Nusrat Mangan and Hassan Sahto be removed.One of the women who introduced herself as Asma, wife of Arshad Pappu, was also among the protesters. She told the journalists that Pappu was on a hunger strike as the jail authorities have put him in the Band Ward since a week. According to her, relatives are not allowed to meet Pappu.Abdul Majeed Khichi, who introduced himself as a PPP worker from Lyari, said that the police had committed atrocities against the people of Lyari, and putting Arshad Pappu behind bars was one of these atrocities. He avoided a repeatedly asked question about Pappu’s connection with the PPP. Gada Naz, an elderly woman, and Lalee another woman in the protest demonstration said that Pappu was innocent and he should be freed. “Pappu hamari jan hein”, said Gada Naz. The protestors alleged that Pappu is being tortured in jail for the last three days. They said that he has been kept in jail without a judicial remand.

22 January 2009

More rains across pakistan and Balochistan from Friday


Meteorological Department Wednesday forecast thunderstorm and rain in Southern Punjab from January 23. Thunderstorm and rain is expected in upper Punjab with snowfall in Murree and Galliat between January 24 and 25. Islamabad is also likely to receive intermittent rain during the period. According to met analysis, westerly wave present over western parts of Balochistan is likely to intensify during next two days. This weather system may cause scattered thunderstorm and rain over different parts of Balochistan and Sindh including Karachi between Jan 23-24 and then gradually spreading to other parts of the country. Scattered thunderstorm and rain is likely from January 23 in Balochistan including earthquake-affected areas and especially Makran coast may receive more rainfall during the period.In NWFP, Kashmir and Northern Areas, scattered thunderstorm and rain associated with snowfall over the mountains is likely from January 24. Scattered thunderstorm and rain is also expected over Upper Sindh while Karachi may also receive light rain from January 23.

Gilani writes off Rs 17.5 billion Balochistan overdraft

ISLAMABAD: Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani directed the authorities on Thursday to immediately freeze the payment of a Rs 17.5 billion State Bank overdraft payable by the Balochistan government and then write it off after six months as the Centre assured the province that a new five-year National Finance Commission (NFC) Award would be finalised before the announcement of the 2009-10 budget. Addressing a high-level meeting to look into Balochistan’s financial difficulties at Prime Minister’s House – Gilani said the federal government would now be responsible for the payment of the overdraft. “Moreover, from the next year, the Federal Public Sector Development Programme (PSDP) for Balochistan will be expanded considerably,” he said. NFC: Talking to Daily Times, the Balochistan finance minister confirmed that Adviser to Prime Minister on Finance Shaukat Tareen had “assured us that a new NFC award would be finalised before the budget of 2009-10”, at the meeting. According to official sources, the federal government is consulting provinces to develop a political-level consensus on a revenue-sharing formula for the federal government and the provincial governments. Similarly, the basis for revenue sharing among the four provinces is also being negotiated with the chief ministers. Punjab has already proposed that 20 percent revenue be shared among the provinces on the basis of multiple factors, while the remaining 80 percent be shared on the basis of population to boost the share of smaller provinces. Sindh, NWFP and Balochistan are likely to make final comments on the proposal during negotiations to be held over the next three months. The three provinces have been demanding that revenue be shared among provinces on the basis of multiple factors instead of population alone. The new NFC award, if agreed before the announcement of the budget, would be based on new projections agreed between the Centre and the federating units, said the official sources. The Centre has already re-constituted the National Finance Commission to finalise the next NFC award. The NFC would also finalise a new mechanism for provincial borrowing from the federal government and interest payments with revised terms and conditions. NFC would also facilitate the provinces to agree on a distribution mechanism for royalty on crude oil production and surcharge on gas production.

Lyari gangster found dead

KARACHI: A prominent Lyari gangster was found dead in the early hours of Tuesday. The bullet-ridden body of Lyari gangster Abid Tingu was found within the jurisdiction of Baghdadi police station. Lyari Town SP Raja Omer Khattab said that the deceased was a member of Rehman Dakait group and was killed by his associates. Khattab said that police wanted Tingu in 17 criminal cases including murder, attempt to murder, police encounters and kidnapping for ransom. Three months ago he killed the uncle of Inspector Yousuf Baloch in a petty dispute and this led to a rift between him and his associates. Since then he was absconding and went to Gawadar, Balochistan from where he had recently arrived in the city.Tingu joined the Lyari gang mafia in 2007, initially working under the supervision of Shahzaib, a commander of Shah Baig Lane of Rehman Dakait. However, Tingu murdered Shazaib and was working under the supervision of Jabbar Jhengu.There were the reports that the Sindh government had announced 0.3 million rupees as reward money on Tingu but Khattab denied the information. Man stabbed to death: Surjani police found the body of 22-year-old Aftab Ahmed from the bushes located at Sector 4-A. The deceased was a resident of Sector 7-D who left his home on Monday night and went missing. The area residents found his body on Tuesday and informed police. According to police, the victim died of stab wounds inflicted by a knife. Woman found dead: The body of a 33-year-old woman was found from the bushes in Mawatch Goth within the jurisdiction of Surjani Police Station. Police say that the deceased was tortured and died as a result of strangulation. Police shifted her body to the Edhi morgue for identification after legal formalities were completed. Elderly man mysteriously dies: The body of a 65-year-old unidentified man was found from Sector 9-B, within the jurisdiction of Saeedabad Police Station. The police was unable to find the cause of his death. His body has been shifted to Edhi morgue for identification.

Iranian Baloch Rebels Kill A Dozen Policemen

Rebels have killed 12 members of the Iranian security forces in an ambush in the restive southeast, judiciary spokesman Ali Reza Jamshidi said on Tuesday. "They were on a mission and they fell into a rebel ambush. Tragically, the 12 were killed," Jamshidi said, adding that the attack happened in Saravan in Sistan-Baluchestan province near the border with Pakistan.
He said those behind the attack had escaped.
On Monday, the Fars news agency reported that rebels had attacked a border patrol van on Sunday afternoon killing several policemen and fled back across the border to Pakistan.
Iranian police have clashed with rebel groups, in particular the Sunni Muslim Jundullah (Soldiers of God), in the province which also lies on a major narcotics-smuggling route from Afghanistan and Pakistan.
The Sunni group has been blamed for a string of attacks and kidnappings in the province, which is home to a large ethnic Baluch community.
The rebel group, headed by Abdolmalek Rigi, said in December that it had killed all 16 Iranian policemen it seized in Saravan in June last year.
On December 29, two Iranian policemen were killed and 10 others wounded in a rare suicide attack in Saravan.

20 January 2009

Iran bases budget on oil price of $37.5

The Iranian government has based its budget bill for 2009-10 on an oil price of 37.5 dollars per barrel, the semi-official news agency ILNA reported on Sunday. "In the final version of the budget bill of the next (Iranian) year the oil price was envisaged at 37.5 dollars per barrel," a presidential aide for planning, Mohammad Ghasem Hosseini, was quoted as saying.
The government is due to submit the budget of the next Iranian year that starts on March 21 to parliament for final approval next week. The government is obliged to save extra income beyond the budget base price in the Oil Stabilisation Fund, which is used to support macro energy projects and prop up private sector projects.
President Mahmoud Ahmaginejad's extravagant withdrawals from the fund for construction projects have, however been criticised by economists who are concerned about the falling oil price and predict a budget deficit. Iran, OPEC's second-biggest crude exporter, is highly dependent on oil money, which is its primary source of income.
The managing director of the National Iranian Oil Company, Seifollah Jashnsaz, has put the country's average oil production at 4.05 million bpd, with an average sale of 2.35 million bpd, the ministry's news web site reported. Crude income accounts for 80 percent of foreign earnings, making the government-run economy highly vulnerable to oil price shifts in particular in the face of the drastic crude price fall of 2008.
Oil prices surged to record highs in July of close to 150 dollars a barrel. But the price has since plunged to below 40 dollars. According to the International Monetary Fund report of 2008, Iran would face an "unsustainable current account deficit" in mid-term if the oil price fell below 75 dollars per barrel.

19 January 2009

Pakistan's Army Thwarts A Historic Opportunity For Peace In Baluchistan


The Baluchi nationalist movement has broken into periods of armed insurgency in the 1950s, the 1960s and the 1970s. In the mid-1970s, an armed uprising was brutally crushed by the Pakistan Army. However, a new movement for political and economic rights, beginning around 2000, turned into another round of armed uprising in the year 2004, led by underground organizations called the Baluch Liberation Army and the Baluch Liberation Front, the former being formed a few years ago. The two organizations owe their intellectual origins to the Baluchistan Students Organization nurtured by the Baluchi tribal elders and intelligentsia.
In the year 2008, a historic opportunity for a political settlement with the pro-independence Baluchi nationalists in the Pakistani province of Baluchistan was lost, undermined by the Pakistani military which is engaged in a bloody struggle to crush a four-year-old armed insurgency in the province. Now, with the Baluchi leaders hardening their stance against the Pakistani state, the Baluchi nationalist movement in the province is nearing a turning point. In order to understand the Pakistani Army's role in preventing a political resolution of the Baluch problem, it is pertinent here to examine the following:
1) Baluchistan's geostrategic position
2) Baluchis' sense of historical deprivation
3) Pakistani Army's role in Baluchistan
4) Historic opportunity for political settlement
5) The Conflict between the Pakistani army and the Pakistani government
1) Baluchistan's Geostrategic Position
The broader region of Baluchistan is spread over parts of Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan. However, the territory under discussion here is the Baluchistan province, geographically the largest of Pakistan's four provinces. Bordered internationally by the Arabian Sea in the south, by Iran in the west and Afghanistan to the north, the Baluchistan province has a geographical area of 350,000 square kilometers but less than 7% of Pakistan's population. In recent years, it has acquired geostrategic importance for China, India, and Iran. Pakistan's construction of a Chinese-funded port in the Baluchi town of Gwadar has added a new dimension to the regional geopolitics, with the port attracting the interests of the militaries of Pakistan's powerful neighbors, especially India and Iran.
With the deployment of U.S. troops in Afghanistan since 2001, China too has shown enhanced interest in the region, indeed expediting the construction of the Gwadar Port. As the port was declared ‘‘fully functional'' on December 21, 2008, a report by the Associated Press of Pakistan, a government-run news agency, highlighted its strategic significance, noting: ‘‘Gwadar will serve as an energy corridor for Central Asia, the Middle East, South Asia and the western part of Asia. The significance of Gwadar is great to both Pakistan and China. Pakistan will be able to have a strategic depth southwest from its naval base in Karachi.'' [1] The Chinese investment in the multi-billion dollar project worries India, as it will vastly erode the Indian Navy's dominance over the Indian Ocean. India has been often accused by Pakistani leaders of fomenting the Baluch insurgency. The port is located at the mouth of the Persian Gulf through which nearly 30 percent of the world's oil supplies pass. Like India, Iran too views it as a threat to its security and economic dominance in the region.
2) Baluchis' Sense of Historical Deprivation
Baluchistan is rich in natural gas, coal, iron, zinc, chromium, and other natural resources. Although it is Pakistan's richest province in natural resources, its people are the poorest in the country and nurse a historical sense of deprivation. The Baluchi nationalists argue that the benefits of the natural resources are accruing to the non-Baluchi populations outside the province while they themselves are deprived of them. As an example of this historical deprivation, the nationalists point out that gas from Baluchistan was supplied to the Punjab province as early as 1964 but Quetta, the capital of Baluchistan, had to wait until 1986. Even today, only four of the 27 districts in Baluchistan are supplied with natural gas, whereas every village in the Sindh and Punjab provinces gets gas. If gas reaches the Baluchis, it does only after the Pakistani Army constructs a garrison in their area. [2] It has also been noted that of the 80 Billion Pakistani Rupees earned in revenue by Pakistan from gas every year, only about seven billion Pakistani Rupees reaches Baluchistan.
The Baluchis resent ‘‘Punjabi domination'' on their province, a popular term that signifies the overwhelming presence of professionals from Punjab province in skilled jobs in Baluchistan. The Pakistani government has declared its plans to develop Gwadar as a free port in the model of Dubai, arguing that it will revolutionize economic development, export-oriented businesses and communications sector, thereby benefiting the people in Baluchistan. However, the Baluchis counter that its revenues will mainly accrue to Islamabad rather than to the provincial government; and since Baluchis are educationally and economically backward, the project's benefits will reach the skilled workers from other provinces. [3] The Baluchis point out that in Gwadar, 65,000 acres of land has been allotted to the institutions of the Pakistani military and government officers at negligible prices, with the beneficiaries being overwhelmingly non-Baluchis.
The Baluchi nationalists also accuse Pakistan of occupying their state without a legal authority. On August 11, 1947 - i.e. four days before India and Pakistan became independent at the midnight beginning August 15, 1947 - the British acceded to the independence of Kalat state, which later came to be called Baluchistan, under its ruler Ahmed Yar Khan, the Khan of Kalat. The treaty was supported by Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the founder of Pakistan. However, all such treaties signed by the British colonial rulers stood terminated as of August 15, 1947 under the Indian Independence Act 1947. The Khan of Kalat, therefore, issued a royal order on August 15, 1947, declaring Baluchistan to be an independent sovereign state. However, the Pakistani Army marched on Baluchistan on April 1, 1948 and within two weeks all members of the Kalat Assembly were imprisoned. Under duress, the Khan of Kalat had to align his state with the newly created Pakistan, but his brother Prince Abdul Karim left for the mountains to lead a guerrilla war against Pakistan. For more than past six decades, the Baluchis have been struggling to restore their sovereignty.
The Baluchi nationalist movement has broken into periods of armed insurgency in the 1950s, the 1960s and the 1970s. In the mid-1970s, an armed uprising was brutally crushed by the Pakistan Army. However, a new movement for political and economic rights, beginning around 2000, turned into another round of armed uprising in the year 2004, led by underground organizations called the Baluch Liberation Army and the Baluch Liberation Front, the former being formed a few years ago. The two organizations owe their intellectual origins to the Baluchistan Students Organization nurtured by the Baluchi tribal elders and intelligentsia. During 2004-2008, the Pakistani Army and the Baluchi fighters have fought pitched battles, the full details of which are yet to be known to the Pakistani and international media.
3) The Pakistani Army's Role in Baluchistan
For the past four years, the Pakistani Army has been carrying out military operation at several places in Baluchistan, especially in the Dera Bugti and Kohlu districts where the armed insurgency is strong. The Baluchi nationalists claim that in recent years the Pakistani Army has carried out harshest military operations against the Baluchi people, forcing them to migrate out of the thinly-populated province. In May 2008, Brahamdagh Bugti, the 28-year-old underground nationalist leader and grandson of Nawab Akbar Bugti, the tribal elder killed by the Pakistani Army, told the media from his hideout that about 10,000 Baluchis have migrated to Afghanistan as a result of the Pakistani military action. Brahamdagh Bugti rejected the Pakistani government's offer to convene talks to find a political solution, vowing instead to continue the armed struggle for independence from Pakistan. [4] As a result of the military operations about 250,000 people are also reported to be internally displaced. [5]
Since the current phase of armed insurgency began four years ago, a number of prominent Baluchi leaders, including Akhtar Mengal, a key nationalist leader, were put in secret jails by Pakistan's intelligence agencies, with their relatives unable to know their whereabouts for several years. In popular Pakistani parlance, such individuals are known as ‘‘missing persons,'' a reference mainly to the Baluchi nationalists but also to the Taliban and Al Qaeda militants and others who disappeared in recent years. It is estimated that about 1,100 people, mostly nationalist leaders and activists, are missing, picked up by Pakistani intelligence agencies during the Pakistan Army's drive to suppress the Baluchi insurgency. [6] In 2006, Pakistan's minister for internal security admitted that about 4,000 people were under arrest in connection with the Baluchi insurgency. [7] In June 2008, Hong Kong-based Asian Human Rights Commission reported that the Pakistani Army has established dozens of secret detention centers inside Baluchistan. [8]
In August 2006, the Pakistan Army, in its attempt to quell the low-intensity Baluchi insurgency, took the extreme step of killing the internationally respected Baluchi elder Nawab Akbar Bugti. The 79-year-old tribal chief is considered a hero by the Baluchis. The military-led government of General Pervez Musharraf had accused him of leading the armed insurgency. The armed insurgency has not been known for any high-profile attack; at best it has involved using small bombs, throwing grenades, killing opponents, and attacking gas pipelines. Nawab Akbar Bugti's killing inflamed Baluchi sentiments and deepened their sense of grievance against the state of Pakistan.
There are two key lines of thinking in the Pakistani Army's drive against the Baluchis. First, acceding to the demands of the Baluchis may lead to the disintegration of the Pakistani state, with the possibility of more demands for autonomy likely to emerge, for example, from the Sindhi nationalists. Secondly, the Pakistani Army sees greater involvement of India in Afghanistan and the region after 9/11. The U.S. forces removed the Taliban from Afghanistan in November 2001. The Taliban, who had been created and supported by the Pakistani Army, fled to Pakistan, paving the way for the Hamid Karzai government in Kabul, that is friendly toward India. Pakistan for the first time is friendless in Kabul.
Additionally, the Pakistani Army thinks that India is aiding the Baluchi insurgents, as several of their leaders are thought to be based in Afghanistan. This means that the Pakistani Army is motivated to crush the Baluchi insurgency militarily rather than permitting the country's political leaders to negotiate a political resolution. It fears that Pakistan will lose strategic depth in Baluchistan in view of the perceived involvement of India, its traditional enemy. In its drive against the armed insurgents, the Pakistani Army has established a number of garrisons and more than 500 security checkposts across the state, while the Pakistani media is barred from reporting the military operations in the province.
In an illustration of how the Pakistani Army maintains tight control on Baluchistan, at least three times in recent years, the Pakistani and international aid agencies have been prevented from providing aid to the Baluchis in times of disasters. The United Nations and the Edhi Foundation, Pakistan's most trusted Nobel-deserving non-governmental rescue service, made attempts to help a large number of Baluchis displaced by the military operation in Kohlu and Dera Bugti districts. Pakistani commentators point out that General Pervez Musharraf, who was accusing the West of not aiding the people affected by the 2005 earthquake in Kashmir, did not allow the UN or Pakistan's own aid agencies to enter Baluchistan. Similarly, in July 2004, hundreds of Baluchis were killed and thousands of homes were destroyed in floods, but the military regime did not permit an appeal from Baluchistan's the then Chief Minister Jam Muhammad Yusuf for international aid to go ahead. In 2008, an earthquake killed more than 200 Baluchis and thousands were displaces, but Pakistan's own aid agencies were denied entry to the earthquake zone to help provide shelters. Pakistani commentators argue that the military wants to keep its operation against the Baluchi insurgents secret. The Pakistani media is totally barred from entering the Kohlu and Dera Bugti districts. In June 2008, a Pakistani daily accused the Pakistani military and its intelligence agencies of ruling over the province of Baluchistan. [9]
4) The Historic Opportunity for Political Settlement
Traditionally, the political leaders in Baluchistan have always been at odds with the federal government over the sharing of resources and revenues. However, in the wake of the February 2008 provincial and parliamentary elections in Pakistan, there did emerge a historic opportunity for dialogue and understanding between the Baluchi nationalists and Pakistan. Although the elections were boycotted by the nationalists, the victory of Pakistan People's Party (PPP) both at the federal level and in Baluchistan created a new opportunity for peace. Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani and Chief Minister Nawab Aslam Raisani respectively formed governments in Islamabad and Baluchistan. Since both the leaders belonged to a single party, there were no differences between the federal and provincial leaders in their thinking about a way forward for the Baluchis. This new opportunity for a single party to formulate policies both at the federal level and in the province created new hope for political settlement.
In fact, the Gilani government, which had won the February elections on the promise of national reconciliation on the outstanding issues confronting Pakistan, took the historic step of apologizing to the Baluchis for the injustices committed against them over the years, signalling Islamabad's serious attempt to resolve the issue politically. As a gesture of goodwill, Prime Minister Gilani released Baluchi nationalist leader and Baluchistan's former Chief Minister Akhtar Mengal from prison in May 2008. He had been arrested by the military-led government of General President Pervez Musharraf in 2006. His release was seen as the new government's serious commitment for reconciliation in Baluchistan. [10]
At the provincial level too, Aslam Raisani, the Chief Minister of Baluchistan, made an effort for reconciliation with the Baluchi nationalists, stating soon after taking the oath of office on April 9, 2008: ‘‘It will be incorrect to describe as terrorists those who took up arms to defend their rights in Baluchistan. The meaning of ‘terrorism' will have to be changed. There is a need for foresight in handling the problems of Baluchistan.'' [11] Aslam Raisani recognized that the release of Akhtar Mengal and other Baluchi nationalists would give a new impetus to the process of reconciliation in Baluchistan. [12]
On their part, the over-ground Baluchi leaders expressed readiness to negotiate. While the armed insurgency continued, Akhtar Mengal made a courageous offer of conditional talks with Islamabad for a political settlement. His offer of talks came despite serious opposition by hardline underground leaders in the Baluchi movement. Some of the demands Akhtar Mengal and others made during various public speeches included: an open inquiry into the killing of Nawab Akbar Bugti, a recognition in some form of the Baluchis' right over their land and natural resources, closing down of garrisons in the province, withdrawal of Pakistani troops from Baluchistan, tracing the missing Baluchi leaders, protection for locals' jobs against the non-Baluchi professionals and traders, and so on. In fact, these are also the demands made unanimously by the politicians of Pakistan's ruling and opposition parties on the floor of the Pakistani Senate. [13] Even the religious parties have backed the Baluchi nationalists' demands. There could not be a better-timed convergence of Baluchi nationalists' viewpoint with that of the ruling and the opposition parties in Pakistan. Prime Minister Gilani, noting a moderation in Baluchi leaders' approach, welcomed Akhtar Mengal's offer of talks with the government, describing it as ‘‘encouraging'' and promising to take steps to restore the confidence of the Baluchi people. [14]
It will be pertinent here to point out that the objectives of the Baluchi nationalist movement are sometimes not clear, though demands for independence or greater autonomy within Pakistan are raised publicly. This confused situation is extremely beneficial, as it gives space for negotiations for a political settlement. In releasing Akhtar Mengal from prison, the Gilani government was hoping to end the armed insurgency. However, rather than ending the insurgency, a political settlement now appears, more than ever, unlikely. This is due to two factors: first, a strong sense of grievance among the Baluchis; and second, the continued Pakistani military operations against the Baluchi fighters since 2004.
During 2008, the Baluchi leaders also realized, though not for the first time, that there were no takers for their offer of political dialogue to resolve the Baluchi issue because of the interference from the military establishment. This realization has been articulated by the key leaders of the Baluchi movement: Akhtar Mengal, Sanaullah Baloch, Talal Bugti and underground leader Brahamdag Bugti; as well as also by Nawab Raisani, the Chief Minister of Baluchistan himself.
A few weeks after his release, Akhtar Mengal noted that the February 2008 elections had brought no positive change in Baluchistan, adding: ‘‘After the elections, changes can be seen in other parts of the country, but the control of [the military intelligence] agencies is strong on Baluchistan.'' [15] Mengal hinted to the Pakistani talks with the Taliban in the North West Frontier Province. Hardening his stance, he added: ‘‘History is witness to the fact that Baluchistan's unification with Pakistan was brought about by force. And when a region is united by force, it is an occupied territory.'' [16] He demanded that the Pakistani troops must withdraw before any talks for a political settlement. [17] Noting the hold of the military on the ruling establishment at the time when General Pervez Musharraf was still the president, he stated: ‘‘The killers of Nawab Akbar Bugti are still present in the government, legislatures and the Presidential Palace [President Musharraf]. We will continue our struggle. We will not relent.'' [18]
At a public meeting in June 2008 in the town of Khazdar in Baluchistan, Akhtar Mengal asked the government of Pakistan to scrap the Chinese-backed Gwadar Port. He argued that only the Baluchis are the owners of land and urged the government to cancel land allotment to government officials and businessmen coming from other provinces to settle there. The Baluchi leader added that confidence-building measures are required before any talks with the government, noting that the talks can be held only if the government accepted the ownership of Baluchis on their land. [19] Significantly, Akhtar Mengal also demanded that the Pakistani government do not go ahead with the proposed Iran-Pakistan-India gas-pipeline that will run through Baluchistan. Under the U.S. pressure not to cut deals with Iran, India for now has withdrawn from the project. Pakistan nevertheless has stated that it will unilaterally sign the agreement with Iran, with the possibility of China becoming another partner. [20] One of the key principles that underpin the demands of the Baluchi leaders is an urge for the recognition of the native population's rights over their land and natural resources. [21]
5) The Conflict between the Pakistani army and the Pakistani government
With the prospects of peace floundering, Baluchi nationalists and others have publicly accused the Pakistani Army of interfering in politics. In fact, Aslam Raisani, the Chief Minister of Baluchistan, too has gone on record to say that the Pakistani military is not allowing a political settlement to take place. Soon after taking the oath of office, Chief Minister Raisani had begun founding a conciliatory approach toward the Baluchi insurgents. However, not even into his second week in office, Chief Minister Raisani's efforts for talks with Baluchi leaders encountered a roadblock from the military establishment. He noted: ‘‘Some people connected with the establishment are creating hurdles in our path [for reconciliation]. The military and the civil bureaucracy have been ruling this country [Pakistan].'' [22]
In an editorial last June, the Urdu-language newspaper Roznama Jasarat - a pro-Jamaat-e-Islami daily that stands for Pakistan's geographical and ideological unity - summed up the situation in Baluchistan: ‘‘[After the new government came to power] no real progress has been made for the resolution of the Baluchistan problem. Some foreign forces are taking advantage of the inflamed sentiments of the people of Baluchistan. In this regard, the role of Pakistan's secret agencies is mysterious and doubtful.... On the pretext of the war against terror, Pakistan has practically turned into the [intelligence] agencies' state, more than a police state. Thousands of youths of Baluchistan, were kidnapped by secret agencies and are missing.'' [23]
In June 2008, the well-known Senator Sanaullah Baloch, one of the key Baluchi leaders, condemned the military operations in Baluchistan, Nawab Akbar Bugti's killing and the arrest previously of Akhtar Mengal by the military-led government of General Pervez Musharraf, and at the end of his speech in the Senate, stunned the people of Pakistan, by announcing his resignation from the house. Sanaullah Baloch pointed out the discriminatory approach of the Pakistani establishment, arguing that if the Gilani government could expedite the implementation of Islamic Shari'a in the North West Frontier Province through executive orders, why it couldn't resolve Baluchistan's problems as quickly. [24]
Senior politicians present in the Senate realized the significance of his resignation. Leader of the House in the Senate Mian Raza Rabbani, along with other politicians from ruling and opposition parties, rushed to Sanaullah Baloch, apologizing for the military operation in Baluchistan. [25] Rabbani remarked that the resignation of Sanaullah Baloch was the bigger news than the assassination of Benazir Bhutto. [26] Several political leaders begged the Baluchi leader to re-consider his resignation. However, in a sign of growing hopelessness for a political settlement, Sanaullah Baloch, who had just returned from a 19-month self-exile from abroad, refused to reconsider his resignation. He added: ‘‘I am resigning from the House as per the decision of my party [Baluchistan National Party]; [1] will support the process of reconciliation even by being outside the House.'' [27] On this occasion, 22 senators from Baluchistan also threatened, in a show of solidarity with him, to resign from the Pakistani Senate.
In October last, the Gilani government made another attempt for peace, presenting a plan for dialogue with the Baluchi leaders. However, the Baluchi leaders turned down the offer, demanding the release of hundreds of their detained comrades first. The leaders noted that the government's claim that it has released 830 Baluchs as a goodwill gesture and closed down about 1,000 cases against them is incorrect. [28] The Baluchi leaders think that the government has to start a series of confidence-building measures before the talks could be held. Other than the release of Akhtar Mengal, the government has no such measures to show despite being ten months in power. There have been growing concerns now as to whether the Gilani government is able to, considering the opposition from the military establishment, seize the moment and engage with the Baluchi nationalists. [29]
Despite its best intentions, the federal government has indeed proved to be ineffective on many other fronts, with a sole claim to its short-lived fame of making controversial peace deals with the Taliban in the North West Frontier Province. Its efforts for political settlement in Baluchistan stand thwarted. At the end of 2008, it emerged again that the Pakistani Army is preventing a political rapprochement between the Baluchi leaders and the civilian political leaders in Islamabad. Talal Akbar Bugti, son of assassinated Baluchi elder Nawab Akbar Bugti, met with President Asif Zardari in late-December 2008 in Islamabad, demanding that the military operation be stopped immediately and the country's intelligence agencies quit the province. His meeting with President Zardari can be interpreted as the Baluchi leaders' flexibility to seek the realization of their objectives within the parameters of Pakistani constitution.
However, as Talal Akbar Bugti was meeting with the president, the Pakistani Army gave a contrary signal by stepping up its operation. On December 21, 2008, Talal Bugti warned: ‘‘We will not be silent on the excesses and injustices being committed in our province. If our voice is not heard and the current [Pakistani] rulers do not remedy the situation, the conditions here will become worse than [the conditions] in Eastern Pakistan [Bangladesh before its creation in 1971].'' [30] This fact that the civilian government led by President Asif Zardari and Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani is not in control of the situation on the ground in Baluchistan was specifically noted by Talal Bugti: ‘‘After the president's assurances [for a political rapprochement], the military operation underway in Baluchistan has picked up momentum.'' [31]

**Tufail Ahmad is Director of Urdu-Pashtu Media Project at the Middle East Media Research Institute (www.memri.org ).

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[1] Associated Press of Pakistan, Pakistan, December 21, 2008.
[2] Newsline, Pakistan, September 2006.
[3] Dawn, Pakistan, February 12, 2007.
[4] Roznama Jasarat, Pakistan, May 19, 2008.
[5] The Nation, Pakistan, June 12, 2008.
[6] Roznama Jang, Pakistan, May 28, 2008.
[7] Newsline, Pakistan, September 2006.
[8] Roznama Jasarat, Pakistan, June 6, 2008.
[9] Roznama Jasarat, Pakistan, June 1, 2008.
[10] Roznama Jasarat, Pakistan, May 10, 2008.
[11] Roznama Nawa-i-Waqt, Pakistan, April 10, 2008.
[12] The News, Pakistan, May 4, 2008.
[13] Roznama Jasarat, Pakistan, June 7, 2008.
[14] Dawn, Pakistan, May 30, 2008.
[15] Roznama Jang, Pakistan, June 1, 2008.
[16] Roznama Jang, Pakistan, June 1, 2008.
[17] Roznama Jang, Pakistan, June 1, 2008.
[18] Roznama Jasarat, Pakistan, May 10, 2008.
[19] Roznama Jang, Pakistan, June 8, 2008.
[20] Roznama Mashriq, Pakistan, May 28, 2008.
[21] Daily Times, Pakistan, June 10, 2008.
[22] Roznama Nawa-i-Waqt, Pakistan, April 17, 2008.
[23] Roznama Jasarat, Pakistan, June 1, 2008.
[24] Roznama Express, Pakistan, June 7, 2008.
[25] Roznama Express, Pakistan, June 7, 2008.
[26] Roznama Jasarat, Pakistan, June 7, 2008.
[27] Roznama Express, Pakistan, June 7, 2008.
[28] Roznama Jasarat, Pakistan, October 29, 2008.
[29] The News, Pakistan, May 4, 2008.
[30] Roznama Jang, Pakistan, December 22, 2008.
[31] Roznama Jang, Pakistan, December 22, 2008.

A Discussion On The Use Of Baloch And Balochi

Baloch: Baloch is generally known as a noun. The native people who live in Balochistan are called Baloch. Generally Baloch people speak Balochi, but even if native people can't speak Balochi, they are still called Baloch. They can migrate and live in other parts of the world. They can still refer to themselves as Baloch. So, I believe that it is now accepted that "Baloch" is noun in this context.
What is the adjective of "Baloch" in English? Our land is called Balochistan, that point is clear. We live in Balochistan. We speak Balochi, we have several Balochi dialects, we weave Balochi carpets, we ride Balochi camels, we give Balochi names to our children. We read Balochi poetry which is published, say, by the Balochi Academy.
However, I have also noticed that often "Baloch" is used as the adjective:
Baloch cultural traditionBaloch Students' OrganisationBaloch authorsBaloch ethnicityBaloch nationalismBaloch National MovementBaloch menBaloch ethnic groupBaloch people
And what about the noun? Am I a Baloch or Balochi? Are my parents Baloch, Balochs, Balochis or Baloches?
Baloch: Baloch is generally known as a noun. The native people who live in Balochistan are called Baloch. Generally Baloch people speak Balochi, but even if native people can't speak Balochi, they are still called Baloch. They can migrate and live in other parts of the world. They can still refer to themselves as Baloch. So, I believe that it is now accepted that "Baloch" is noun in this context.Mistakenly, some non-Baloch scholars use the word "Balochi", instead of "Baloch" when referring to people of Balochistan. For instance, they may say: "Baaraan is Balochi". It is wrong. "Baaraan is a Baloch" is the right expression. One may say that "Baaraan is a Balochi name", which is a correct phrase to say.
So, I am a Baloch, not Balochi (likewise, Hazhaar is a Kurd. Hazhaar is a Kurdish name. But saying "Hazhaar is a Kurdish" is a rather an inaccurate expression).On many occasion, the article "the" is used before "Baloch", when we refer to people of Balochistan (in national adjective usage). For instance, national adjectives ending in "ch" or "sh" e.g. the Dutch, the Spanish, the Welsh (see The Oxford Library of English Usage, Chapter I, 1990. Similarly we can say "the Baloch" etc. Other parallel examples:Javier is a Spaniard. He speaks Spanish. He eats Spanish food. He is a Spanish person. (But although one may say that "He is a Spanish", the more accurate way is to say it is "Javier is a Spaniard", instead of "Javier is a Spanish. The same applies for Scot (native Scottish person from Scotland) etc.Please remember that there is not a universal rule about this issue. e.g. " Shah Latif was a Sindi (Sindhi). He spoke Sindi (Sindhi) and he was from Sind (Sindh). As you see in this case the word "Sindi" is used both as the noun for naming people from Sind and the language.As for Plural version of the word "Baloch", there is no universal accepted form. Some people use "Balochs", other use "Baloches". Increasing number of people use "Baloch" as both singular and plural. In my view, using "Baloch" as both singular and plural is somehow a better way to use it. A parallel in English language is the=2 0word "Dutch" (people and language of Holland). When referring to people from Holland, they are called "Dutch", whether one or many people. I have never seen expressions such as "Dutchs" or "Dutches". I think it looks nicer in a sentence to use "Baloch" as both singular and plural form. One can understand from the sentence, whether we talk about one person or many. It is a personal preference, but words "Balochs" or "Baloches" do not appeal to me. I rather use "Baloch" only. (Some people may write it as "Baluch", "Balouch" etc. Again "Baluchs/Baluches" or "Balouchs/Balouches" do not sound "attractive".Balochi: Anything related to the Baloch (people from Balochistan) can be described as Balochi. It can have genitive form or simply used as an adjective.
Languge of the Baloch is called Balochi. Not only, we the Baloch, call it "Balochi", but every other non-Baloch person also calls it "Balochi". At least, there is unanimous acceptance about this issue. There are still variations in spelling "Balochi" such as "Baluchi" and "Balouchi". But it is not a big issue."Balochi" is mainly used as an adjective e.g. "Balochi dress", "Balochi book", "Balochi dance", etc. "Baloch" cannot be used in the same context. It is, however, to be noticed when one refers directly to people, i.e. the Baloch, it is rather use "Baloch" not "Balochi" in any compound nouns. e.g.Baloch Students' Federation (not Balochi Students' Federation) as it refers to Baloch people (in this case, students). Also=2 0"Baloch women" but NOT Balochi women (again Baloch refers to people, women) etc.In the meantime, there is a need for a flexible approach towards this issue, as there is no standard/universal rule especially with regards to "Baloch", "Balochi" etc. The same applies to Balochi orthography (both in Persian/Urdu and Latin/English alphabets). At this stage, there is no excuse for exclusion of any approach, style and preferences. As for various dialects of Balochi language, there is an even greater need for flexibility. All Balochi accents should be encouraged both orally and in written forms.

Man walks on burning coal in "trial by fire" in Balochistan

Balochistan Quetta , A man walked on burning coal in Balochistan today in a"trial by fire"after a tribal jirga or council ordered him to do so to prove his innocence in a property dispute. Nazim Ali walked bare foot over blazing coal placed in a pit measuring 12 feet by two feet. Footage beamed by TV channels showed senior jirga members and hundreds of people watching the event that occurred in the Mastung region of Balochistan. Soon after he crossed the pit, Ali & aposs feet were dipped in cold water. The jirga members will monitor his feet during the next few hours to check if blisters appear. " Despite passing over the burning coal, blisters never appear on the feet of the innocent,"said Hazoor Bakhsh, an elder who claimed he had firm belief in the tribal traditions.
During such a"trial by fire", mounds of wood are burnt in the pit to produce enough cinder for the test. Traditionally, the feet of the person undergoing the test are dipped in the blood of a freshly slaughtered goat soon after he crosses the pit. However, the use of cold water is prevalent in some areas.
After a person has walked over the fire, tribal elders wait anywhere between three and 10 hours to see if blisters appear on his feet. If blisters are spotted, the person is declared"guilty"of the charges brought against him. Ali walked over the coal-filled pit to prove his innocence in a family dispute over land.

Describing the practice as"illogical, unconstitutional and barbaric,"lawmaker S M Zafar, chairman of the Senate&aposs standing committee on human rights, asked the government and civil society to join hands to create awareness for ending such superstitious practices.

Foreign hands behind violence in Balochistan’

LAHORE: Evidence shows that foreign hands are involved in the unrest prevailing in the province, and incidents of terrorism have increased in Balochistan since the Mumbai attacks, a private TV channel quoted Balochistan Police chief Asif Nawaz Waraich as saying. According to the channel, Waraich said the activists of banned Lashkar-e-Jhangwi had developed a nexus with the militant groups in the province, and were using sanctuaries of militants to carry out terrorist attacks. He said at least 13 suspects had been arrested in connection with the killing of four policemen on January 14 in Quetta.

18 January 2009

2008 most violent year in a decade for Balochistan

QUETTA: The outgoing year was the most violent in a decade for the Balochistan province in which 433 people lost their lives, including 73 victims of ‘target killing’ and 43 were killed in the name of honour. Statistics indicate a constant rise in murder cases in the country’s largest province since 1997, when 241 people were killed. Official data confirms 303 people were killed in 2005, the number rose to 341 in 2006 and was recorded at 390 in 2007. It was the first year that the killings crossed the 400 mark. The year saw a considerable rise is target killings, with the targets including police personnel and even journalists. The Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA), a banned militant outfit that demands an independent Balochistan, claimed responsibility for the majority of the killings, justifying them as a response to the ‘state’s injustices against the Baloch people’.The most alarming targeted killing was the murder of Professor Safdar Kayani, acting vice chancellor of University of Balochistan, on April 22.The BLA victims also included two personnel of the Pakistan Army and two recruits of the Military Intelligence (MI). The four officials were killed in April.The BLA also killed six boys, most of them from the Hazara community, who were playing cricket in front of the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) office on May 30. July saw the targeted killing of 54 people, including a Balochistan High Court lawyer, Ghulam Mustafa. Forty-one 1 people were killed in August, most victims of targeted killing. The number of people targeted in September was 73.A majority of the targeted killings’ victims were officials of the Pakistan Army, Frontier Corps, police, intelligence agencies and members of the Punjabi, Hazara and Baloch ethnic communities, who the BLA claimed, ‘spied’ for the government against Baloch interests.Terrorism: The year also witnessed an increase in terrorist activities, as 120 bomb blasts, 208 rocket attacks, 141 landmine explosions and 32 hand grenade attacks were recorded in the province, which killed more than 150 people and injured an estimated 200. Sources said 24 explosions occurred in January, 71 were recorded in February and 52 explosions occurred in March. There were 32 explosions in April, including 19 rocket attacks, six hand grenade assaults and six bomb blasts, which killed four people, including three government officials, and injured nine civilians. Twenty-one people were killed in terrorist activities in the months of May and June, while around 25 explosions in July killed 16 people, including eight government officials.August followed with 16 bomb blasts, 80 rockets attacks, nine hand grenades attacks and two landmine explosions that killed 16 people, including four government functionaries and injured 60 people. There were seven rocket attacks, seven bomb blasts and three hand grenade attacks in September that killed seven people, while 12 explosions in October killed 12 people. Thirty-one explosions in November killed four people, while when 45 explosions, including 16 bomb blasts, 26 rocket attacks and three landmine explosions in December killed four people.Around 43 people, including 32 women, were killed in various parts of Balochistan in the name of honour during the first nine months of 2008, said a report by Aurat Foundation.In most cases of honour killing, the culprits were reported to be the victim’s family.Security experts believe the situation in Balochistan could have been worse had the three militant groups - the BLA, the Baloch Republican Army (BRA) and the Baloch Liberation Front (BLF) - not declared a ceasefire in September.However, the BRA announced the end of the ceasefire on January1, saying the government had killed several innocent Baloch tribesmen in fresh attacks on Dera Bugti. The two other groups are likely to follow suit, analysts say, fearing the Balochistan government was likely to face further problems in 2009.

Gilani pledges all resources to Balochistan

ISLAMABAD: The government firmly believes progress and prosperity of Balochistan is in the country’s best interest, Prime Minister (PM) Yousuf Raza Gilani said on Friday. He said he was giving high priority to its development and all necessary resources would be provided for it. The PM was talking to Balochistan’s cabinet members, headed by Chief Minister Nawab Muhammad Aslam Raisani at Prime Minister’s house. He said the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) would protect the rights of smaller provinces as enshrined in the 1973 Constitution. The party would also continue its struggle for the supremacy of parliament and promotion of democracy in the country, he added. The PM said Shaheed Zulfikar Ali Bhutto ‘kept the safeguard of the rights of smaller provinces in mind’ while framing the 1973 constitution. That is why he preferred the bicameral system in which equal representation was given to each province. Thus, making sure the constitution is not amended without the consent of all units.He said Balochistan had an advantage due to its reserves of minerals and other natural resources and it was their duty to develop and explore those resources for the progress and betterment of the people there. Challenging government: Talking about the situation in Swat, the PM said nobody would be allowed to challenge the writ of the government. He condemned the elements that had forced the closure of several girls’ schools in the area. He added that Islam preached peace, harmony and tolerance and abhorred terrorism and extremism. The delegation appreciated the PM’s interest in solving Balochistan’s problems. It also praised Mr Gilani for inaugurating the Gwadar Port on time, which would encourage business activities and attract large investments in the area.

Central Asia’s waking giant


It makes sense for the West, particularly the European Union, to seek cooperation with the SCO, as this would also help counter Russia’s attempts to use it as a tool for its anti-Western policies. It would also prevent the SCO from turning into a militarised entity
The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) brings together almost half the world’s population, several members own nuclear weapons, many are big energy suppliers, and it includes some of the world’s fastest growing economies. Yet few outside Central Asia have heard much about it.The SCO emerged from the wreckage of the Soviet Union in 1996. Today, its members are Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, while Mongolia, Iran, Pakistan and India are observers. Russia and China remain the lead actors. Since its launch, the SCO’s military exercises have become increasingly ambitious, growing from largely bi-lateral to inclusion of all members. The SCO is also beginning to work together in the fight against drug trafficking and organised crime.Until recently, the SCO’s members addressed energy issues only bilaterally. But, in order to coordinate energy strategies and strengthen energy security, last year the organisation launched a club that unites energy-producing and energy-consuming states, transit countries, and private companies. The SCO promotes free trade, too, and aims to build essential infrastructure such as roads and railways to link its members and boost commerce between them while also harmonising customs systems and tariffs.Yet cooperation within the SCO remains focused on national rather than collective objectives, because its members’ interests vary so much. China, for example, seeks markets for its products and further energy resources, while Russia aims to use the SCO to promote its anti-Western agenda. The group’s other members — led by China and Kazakhstan — want to strengthen their already robust levels of economic cooperation with the West. Thus, for example, at the SCO summit in August, Russia did not get the support of other members regarding the Georgia conflict.These diverging objectives make it hard to believe that the SCO will ever evolve into an eastern version of NATO. True, its members have held joint military exercises and have expressed a desire to build the SCO into a more mature security organisation. But the SCO still lacks many essential elements of a full-grown NATO-style security organisation.The SCO has no integrated military-political structure, and no permanent operational headquarters. It has no rapid-reaction force and does not engage in regular political deliberations. NATO’s focus is on external security risks, while the SCO’s members target security issues within their own territories.It makes sense for the West, particularly the European Union, to seek cooperation with the SCO, as this would also help counter Russia’s attempts to use it as a tool for its anti-Western policies. It would also prevent the SCO from turning into a militarised entity.These may look like negative reasons for the EU to engage with the SCO, but there are also ample positive reasons for encouraging cooperation. Europe needs energy supplies from Central Asia, and Central Asia needs European investment.Another sphere of mutual interest is Afghanistan. At present, the EU offers financial support to the Afghan government and helps to train its police and judiciary. The SCO has established a contact group with Afghanistan. Both sides want to do more, and they might be able to make a greater impact by working together rather than separately. The EU has money and the SCO, most of whose members border Afghanistan, has trained personnel and direct experience in the region.Cooperation with NATO also looks strategically wise. Given China’s importance in both military and economic matters, growing energy and trade relations between Central Asia and the West, and the reasonable assumption that Central Asia’s security will continue to have great significance for Western security, cooperation between the SCO, the EU, and NATO looks inevitable. This is all the more true in view of the common security threats faced by NATO and the SCO in Central Asia, such as Al Qaeda and Taliban-sponsored terrorism and drug trafficking.But both NATO and the SCO have so far hesitated to engage in closer contact. It is hard to discern whether NATO has any opinion at all about the SCO. At best, NATO seems to regard it as being neither a problem nor an opportunity.Reaching out to the SCO would certainly seem to support NATO’s stated objectives. After 9/11, the alliance came to the conclusion that threats may need to be dealt with on a worldwide basis, which explains NATO’s presence in Afghanistan. As a part of this global strategy, NATO strengthened its relations with partners elsewhere, including in Southeast Asia which is the SCO’s chief area of responsibility.Perhaps inevitably, the SCO — and Russia and China as its leading members — regards NATO’s increased presence in the region with some mistrust. As long as NATO remains reluctant to enter into a dialogue with the SCO, such a cautious attitude looks set to linger, and may even intensify. Consideration also needs to be given, therefore, to the establishment of a NATO-China Council, along the lines of the NATO-Russia Council, and to the creation of arrangements that would facilitate greater cooperation with the SCO as a whole.Such cooperation would not bridge the main differences between SCO members and the West over issues like democratisation and human rights. Cooperation would also need to comprise much more than mere joint policy development, and should involve the practical pursuit of mutually beneficial, smaller-scale ad hoc projects. NATO and the SCO could work together on neutralising anti-personnel mines in Afghanistan, as well as other possible types of confidence-building measures, such as joint police training and counter-narcotics operations.If security cooperation is to be a success, politically sensitive issues should be avoided, with the emphasis squarely on practical measures. This approach would serve the interests of the EU, NATO, the SCO’s members, and, not least, Afghanistan. —DTPSMarcel de Haas is a Senior Researcher at the Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael